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Abstract
Continuous availability of HPC systems built from com-
modity components have become a primary concern as sys-
tem size grows to thousands of processors. In this paper,
we present the analysis of 8-24 months of real failure data
collected from three HPC systems at the National Center
for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). The results show
that the availability is 98.7-99.8% and most outages are due
to software halts. On the other hand, the downtime are
mostly contributed by hardware halts or scheduled main-
tenance. We also used failure clustering analysis to identify
several correlated failures.
1. Introduction
Continuous availability of high performance computing
(HPC) systems built from commodity components have be-
come a primary concern as system size grows to thousands
of processors. To design more reliable systems, a solid un-
derstanding of failure behavior of current systems is in need.
Therefore, we believe failure data analysis of HPC systems
can serve three purposes. First, it highlights dependability
bottlenecks and serves as a guideline for designing more
reliable systems. Second, real data can be used to drive
numerical evaluation of performability models and simula-
tions, which are an essential part of reliability engineering.
Third, it can be applied to predict node availability, which
is useful for resource characterization and scheduling [1].
In this paper, we studied 8-24 months of real failure data
collected from three HPC systems1 at the National Center
for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). The remainder
of this paper is organized as follows. In §2 we described
the systems characteristics and failure data collection. We
present preliminary analysis of failure data in §3, followed
by failure distribution and correlation analysis in §4 and §5.
∗This work was supported in part by Contract 74837-001-0349 from
the Regents of University of California (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
to William Marsh Rice University and by National Science Foundation
under grant ACI 02-19597.
1All NCSA HPC systems described in this paper have been decommis-
sioned in 2003 and 2004.
We summarize related work in §6 and conclude our study in
§7.
2. The Systems and Measurements
The three HPC systems we studied are quite different ar-
chitecturally. The first is an array of SGI Origin 2000 (O2K)
machines. SGI Origin 2000 is a cc-NUMA distributed
shared memory supercomputer. An O2K can have up to 512
CPUs and 1 TB of memory, all under control of one single-
system-image IRIX operating system. The configuration at
NCSA is an array of twelve O2K’s (total 1520 CPUs) con-
nected by proprietary, high-speed HIPPI switches. Table 1
lists its detailed specification. The machines A, B, E, F, and
N are equipped with 250 MHz MIPS R10000 processors,
and the rest with 195 MHz MIPS R10000 processors. M4
accepts interactive access, while the others machines only
service batch jobs. Peak performance of NCSA O2K is 328
gigaflops.
The second and the third systems are Beowulf-style PC
clusters. “Platinum” cluster has 520 two-way SMP 1 GHz
Pentium-III nodes (1040 CPUs), 512 of which are compute
nodes (2 GB memory), and the rest are storage nodes and
interactive access nodes (1.5 GB memory). “Titan” cluster
consists of 162 two-way SMP 800 MHz Itanium-1 nodes
(324 CPUs), 160 of which are compute nodes (1.5 GB
memory) and 2 are for interactive access. Both clusters use
Myrinet 2000 and Gigabit Ethernet as system interconnect.
Myrinet is faster and for node communications, whereas the
Gigabit Ethernet is slower and serves I/O traffic. Both clus-
ters have one teraflop of peak performance.
All three HPC systems use batch job control software to
manage workload. O2K runs LSF (Load Sharing Facility)
queueing system. Each job on O2K have resource limits of
50 hours of run-time and 256 CPUs. Platinum and Titan
employ Portable Batch System with the Maui Scheduler,
and the job limits are 352 and 128 nodes for 24 hours, re-
spectively.
According to a user survey [8], the NCSA HPC sys-
tems are devoted to multiple disciplinary sciences research:
physics (20%), engineering (16%), chemistry (14%), biol-
ogy (13%), astronomy (13%), and material science (12%).
Seventy percent of users write programs in Fortran (F90 and
F77) or mix of Fortran and C/C++. Sixty-five percent users
use MPI or OpenMP as the parallel programming model. In
terms of job sizes, 22% users typically allocate 9-16 CPUs.
About equally many users (14-15%) allocate 2-4, 5-8, 17-
32, or 33-64 CPUs.
The failure log was collected in the form of monthly
or quarterly reliability reports. At the end of a month or
aquarter, a report for each node/machine is created. A re-
port records outage date (but no outage time), type, and
duration. There are five outage types defined by NCSA
system administrator: Software Halt (SW), Hardware Halt
(HW), Scheduled Maintenance (M), Network Outages, and
Air Conditioning or Power Halts (PWR). The cause of an
outage is determined as follows: a program runs at machine
boot time prompts the administrator to enter the reason for
the outage. If nothing is entered after two minutes, the pro-
gram defaults to recording a Software Halt.
The data collection period was two years (April 2000 to
March 2002) for O2K and eight months (January 2003 to
August 2003) for Platinum and Titan. In this set of fail-
ure log, there is no occurrence of Network Outage, so we
exclude it from the rest of analysis.
3. Preliminary Results
Before describing the failure data, we would like to clar-
ify some terminology. Time to Failure (TTF) is the interval
between the end of last failure and the beginning of next
failure. Time between Failures (TBF) is the interval be-
tween the beginnings of two consecutive failures. Time to
Repair (TTR) is synonymous with Downtime. Figure 1 il-
lustrates the differences. Because the failure log does not
include the start and end times of outages, we can only cal-
culate TBFs in terms of days.
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Figure 1. TBF, TTF, and TTR
Table 1 and 2 and Figure 2 summarize the failure data
for the three HPC systems. There are two kind of availabil-
ity measures. The usual availability is computed as
1−
∑
(# Down CPU× Downtime)
# Total CPU × Total time
The scheduled availability (S Avail) removes the Scheduled
Maintenance downtime from consideration and only counts
scheduled uptime as total time, so it is computed as
1−
∑
(# Down CPU × Unsched. Downtime)
# Total CPU× Sched. time
Note that in O2K’s case, the twelve machines have different
number of CPUs, so “# Down CPU” is the number of CPUs
on the failed machine. In Platinum and Titan’s case, the “#
Down CPU” is 2.
For the whole system of O2K, the TBF reported in Ta-
ble 1 is actually TBF, and the downtime is the weighted
average of individual machine downtimes:
∑
(# Down CPU × Downtime)
# Total CPU
From the data it is obvious that software halts account
for most outages (59-83%), but the average downtime (i.e.
MTTR) is only 0.6-1.5 hours. On the other hand, although
the fraction of hardware outages is meager (1-13%), aver-
age hardware downtime is the greatest among all unsched-
uled outage types (6.3-100.7 hours). This is reasonable
because hardware problems usually requires ordering and
replacing parts and performing tests, while many software
problems can be fixed by reboot.
We contacted the NCSA staff about the hardware fail-
ure causes of PC clusters. We were told that there were
two or three cases where power supplies needed to be re-
placed; otherwise, the main cause of hardware outages is the
Myrinet, including network cards, cables, and switch cards.
A network card resides at a host PC and is connected by ca-
bles to the Myrinet switch enclosure. A Myrinet switch en-
closure stacks many Myrinet M3-SPINE switch cards. The
usual symptom that prompts a network card or switch card
replacement is there are excessive CRC check errors. Some-
times the self-testing in a switch card may fail and lead to
replacement. Cable replacements also occurred because the
“ping” query packets cannot get through.
The availability is lower for O2K because when one of its
machine is down, as much as one-sixth of the overall sys-
tem capacity could disappear (e.g. machine B, which has
256 CPUs.) This is unlike PC clusters in which each node
usually contains no more than 8 CPUs, so the availability
could degrade more gracefully, assuming the outage is not
catastrophic such as a power failure or network partition-
ing. Although monolithic single-system-image machines
benefit from ease of administration, a unified view of pro-
cess space, and extremely fast interprocess communication,
it seems large systems composed of finer-grained manage-
ment units are more favorable in terms of availability.
For O2K, the machine-wise TBFs and TTRs are skewed
toward small values. Eleven of twelve machines have
MTBF greater than 8 days, but the medians of TBF are
mostly smaller than 4 days. For TTR, nine machines’
MTTR are greater than 2.5 hours, yet the medians are 0.3-
0.9 hours. The same phenomenon also occurs on Platinum
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All A B E F H1 H J M M2 M4 N S
CPUs 1520 128 256 128 128 128 128 128 128 64 48 128 128
Mem (GB) 618 64 128 64 76 64 32 32 32 16 14 64 32
Outages 687 87 182 40 81 42 25 32 24 41 59 37 37
SW (%) 59 74 68 53 63 57 60 59 42 44 39 49 46
HW(%) 13 8 19 13 9 21 8 3 17 10 5 5 32
M(%) 21 11 12 28 20 12 24 19 29 32 49 38 14
PWR(%) 7 7 2 8 9 10 8 19 13 15 7 8 8
Downtime
(day)
9.5 8.7 19.2 15.3 5.9 13.8 6.2 3.6 4.8 7.5 4.5 5.5 5.0
SW (%) 27 32 49 11 36 9 5 25 15 27 12 6 16
HW(%) 28 35 29 1 10 67 49 < 1 22 12 4 28 22
M(%) 41 28 20 85 44 22 45 66 58 52 75 62 58
PWR(%) 4 4 2 3 9 2 2 9 4 9 10 4 4
Avail(%) 98.7 98.8 97.4 97.9 99.2 98.1 99.2 99.5 99.3 99.0 99.4 99.2 99.3
S Avail(%) 99.2 99.1 97.9 99.7 99.6 98.5 99.5 99.8 99.7 99.5 99.8 99.7 99.7
MTBF (day) 1.0 8.1 4.0 15.9 8.6 14.7 29.5 22.5 30.3 17.4 12.3 18.6 18.5
StdDev 2.1 14.5 5.8 28.5 14.7 20.9 36.9 33.4 48.3 31.7 18.7 34.3 22.9
Median 0.9 1.7 2.1 1.7 2.5 3.5 25.0 1.0 4.0 1.6 5.7 1.0 11.0
MTTR (hr) 3.5 2.4 2.5 9.2 1.7 7.9 6.0 2.7 4.8 4.4 1.9 3.6 3.2
StdDev 13.1 7.8 5.2 29.9 5.1 33.2 15.6 7.5 9.3 7.7 8.1 8.8 7.2
Median 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.43 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5
MTTR SW 1.5 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.0 1.3 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.7 0.6 0.4 1.1
MTTR HW 6.3 10.5 3.9 0.6 2.0 24.7 36.3 0.4 6.4 5.4 1.3 18.6 2.2
MTTR M 8.0 5.8 4.3 28.6 3.9 14.6 11.2 9.6 9.6 7.1 2.8 5.9 13.8
MTTR PWR 2.1 1.5 3.4 3.8 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.8 2.6 1.7 1.7
Table 1. O2K Failure Data Summary
Platinum Titan
Outages 7279 947
Outage/Node 14.00 5.85
SW (%) 84 60
HW (%) < 0.1 5
M (%) 16 1
PWR (%) 0 34
Downtime/Node (hr) 12.16 12.55
SW (%) 69 18
HW (%) 10 18
M (%) 21 < 1
PWR (%) 0 64
Avail (%) 99.79 99.78
S Avail (%) 99.83 99.79
Platinum Titan
System MTBF (hr) 0.79 5.99
StdDev 5.77 40.09
Node MTBF (day) 14.16 26.89
StdDev 15.87 25.75
Median 9 29
Node MTTR (hr) 0.87 2.15
StdDev 4.27 4.65
Median 0.15 0.28
MTTR SW 0.70 0.63
MTTR HW 100.67 7.60
MTTR M 1.15 0.55
MTTR PWR − 4.08
Table 2. Platinum and Titan Failure Data Summary
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Figure 2. The rows from top to bottom depict weekly Availability, Outages, Downtime, and Failure
Clustering (see §5), respectively. The X axis in all plots is week. The Y axis in Downtime row is
CPU-hours and in Failure Clustering row, the number of machines/nodes involved.
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and Titan’s node TTR. These prompt us to study examine
closely the distributions of TBF and TTR, which we docu-
mented our findings in the next section.
4. Failure Distribution
In analytical modeling, the distributions of TBF and TTR
are key components for obtaining precise results [12] be-
cause distributions of the same mean and variance can still
yield very different outcomes. In this section, we investi-
gate the distributions of TBF and TTR with the assumption
that failures and repairs are all independent.
We first choose a set of distributions as our parametric
probability models and seek the parameters that best fit the
data to these models. An open-source statistical package
called WAFO [2] is used to find parameters. Then we ap-
ply chi-square test as goodness-of-fit test to pick the best-fit
distribution.
Our selection of probability models includes exponen-
tial, gamma distribution and a family of heavy-tail distri-
butions (Weibull, Truncated Weibull, Log-normal, Inverse
normal, and Pareto [4]). Heavy-tail means the complemen-
tary cumulative distribution function 1−F (x) decays more
slowly than exponentially. Heavy-tail distributions are cho-
sen because many failure data studies (e.g. [10, 3]) have
shown that they are actually more prevalent than exponen-
tial distribution, which is commonly assumed in probability
models to make analysis tractable.
For each system, we conglomerate TBF and TTR data of
all machines/nodes and present their distributions and fitting
functions in Figure 3. For O2K, the TTR is fit by Inverse
normal f(x) = 1.87(2pix3)−0.5 exp(−12.76(x−0.37)2/x)
and TBF by Weibull F (x) = 1 − exp(−5.61x0.5). For
Platinum, the TTR is fit by Truncated Weibull F (x) =
1 − exp(−6.79(x + 0.14)0.15 + 5.07) and TBF by Expo-
nential F (x) = 1 − e−0.07x. For Titan, the TTR is fit by
Gamma f(x) = 0.27x−0.51e−0.23x and TTR by Exponen-
tial F (x) = 1− e−0.037x.
The distributions of Titan’s failure data have staircase-
like shapes unfound in other two systems’. For example,
there are two sudden shoot-ups at 1.4 hour and 6.8 hour
in Titan’s TTR distribution. The shoot-ups mean that there
were massive nodes down for about the same period of time,
which implies a possibility of correlated failure. To under-
stand this anomaly, we perform a failure correlation analy-
sis, as described in the next section.
5. Failure Correlation
In the last section we assumed the failures are indepen-
dent and derived the failure distribuion. Failure indepen-
dence is a common assumption in reliability engineering to
1
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Figure 3. Distributions of node TBF and TTR.
Dashed line is the fitting distribution. The X
axis in TBF plots is day and in TTR plots, hour.
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simplify analysis and system design. However, many sta-
tistical tests and log analyses showed that real-world dis-
tributed computing environments do exhibit correlated fail-
ures.
In this section, we investigate how outages of different
machines relate to each other by clustering approach [13].
Roughly speaking, this approach groups failures which are
close either in space or in time. It should be emphasized
that the correlation resulted from clustering is purely statis-
tical and does not imply the failures really have cause-and-
effect (causal) relationship. Since our collection of failure
log lacks error details, we can only rely on statistics to find
correlation.
To not confuse with the word “cluster” in “PC clusters,”
we will refer to a failure cluster as a “batch.” We define a
batch to be a time period [T1, T2] in which every day there
is at least one outage (regardless of type), and no outages
occur on day T1 − 1 or T2 + 1. Put another way, we co-
alesce into a batch the failures of different machines/nodes
that occur in consecutive days. The bottom row of Figure 2
illustrates the results. The width and height of a rectangle
indicate the duration and the machine/node count of that
batch, respectively.
Using this method, we found there are 79 batches for
O2K, accounting for 55 percent of all outages. Eight-five
percent of batches last for no more than three days, and
89 percent of batches involve no more than four machines.
There are four batches that involve all twelve machines. In
week 31, the failure was caused by power or air condition-
ing problem and was followed a two-day maintenance. In
week 35, there was a system-wide maintenance on the first
day, but some machines experienced hardware halts and all
were again taken offline for maintenance on the second day,
and all machines had short software problems on the last
day. In week 78, a system maintenance occurred and lasted
37-91 hours. The last catastrophic outage occurred on week
97 due to power problems. Note that the massive outages in
week 31,35, and 78 are also reflected as spikes in Availabil-
ity and Downtime plots.
The failure clustering plot also reveals some possible
failure correlation in Platinum and Titan systems. Statis-
tically speaking, the chance of a batch having a great deal
of outages in a short time (e.g. the razor-thin rectangles in
the bottom row of Figure 2) is close to zero. Thus, a rea-
sonable explanation for such an occurrence is failure corre-
lation. To justify this claim, we take Platinum system as
an example. There is a batch in week 4 which contains
501 nodes in one day. If we assumes failures are indepen-
dent and TBF has exponential distribution, then the num-
ber of failures in a given duration follows Poisson distribu-
tion. So the chance of at least 501 outages in one day is∑
∞
n=501
(e−3030n/n!) = 6.3 × 10−14 where 30 is the av-
erage number of outages per day of Platinum system. After
checking the log, it shows that particular outage is Software
Halt and gives 5-15 minutes downtime.
Titan system’s failure correlation is even more conspic-
uous. The three peaks represent massive outages at week
10, due to a 9 minute software halt followed by 6.8 hours of
hardware halt, at week 14, due to 1.4 hours of power failure,
and at week 21, due to 6.8 hours of power failure. The 1.4
and 6.8 hours of downtime explains the two sudden rises in
Titan’s TTR distribution in Figure 3 as most nodes experi-
enced them. The three staircases in Titan’s TBF distribution
reflect the intervals among the three massive outages, which
are 64, 29, and 48 days. As in O2K’s case, the three out-
ages of Titan are also mirrored in Availability, Outages, and
Downtime plots.
6. Related Work
Field failure data analysis of very large HPC systems
is usually for internal circulation and is almost never pub-
lished in detail. Nevertheless, there are several talks and
reports that shed light on the administration experience of
some of the world’s most powerful supercomputers.
Koch [5] reported the situtaiton of ASCI White. A
whole-system reboot of ASCI White takes 4 hours and pre-
ventive maintenance is performed weekly, with separate pe-
riods for software and hardware. Machine problems oc-
curred in every aspect of the system. Transient CPU faults
generated invalid floating-point numbers, and it took great
effort to spot these corrupted nodes because they passed
standard diagnostic tests and only failed in real programs.
Bad optical interconnects led to non-repeatable link errors
which corrupted the computation because these errors could
sneak through network host firmware without being de-
tected. The storage system was not 100% dependable ei-
ther. The parallel file-system sometimes failed to return I/O
error to the user program when the program was dumping
restart files. In addition, the archival subsystem’s buggy
firmware corrupted restart files and made the user program
fail to launch.
Seager [11] showed that the reliability of the ASCI
White improved over time as MTBF increased steadily from
as short as 5 hours in January 2001 to 40 hours in Febru-
ary 2003. Except uncategorized failures, the storage sys-
tem (both local disks and IBM Serial Disk System) is the
main source of hardware problems. Next to disks is CPU
and third-party hardware troubles. For software, communi-
cation libraries and operating systems contributed the most
interruptions.
Morrison [9] reported operations of the ASCI Q during
June 2002 thru February 2003. The MTBI (mean time be-
tween interruption) is 6.5 hours, and on the average there
were 114 unplanned outages per month. Putting storage
subsystem aside, hardware problems account for 73.6% of
6
node outages, with CPU and memory modules being re-
sponsible for over 96% of all hardware faults (CPU is 62.5%
and memory is 33.6%.) Network adaptors or system boards
seldom fail.
Levine [7] described the failure statistics of Pittsburgh
Supercomputing Center’s supercomputer Lemieux: MTBI
during April 2002 to February 2003 is 9.7 hours, shorter
than predicted 12 hours. The availability is 98.33% during
mid-November 2002 to early February 2003.
The National Energy Research Scientific Computing
Center (NERSC) houses several supercomputers and their
operations are summarized in NERSC’s annual self-
evaluation reports [6]. During August 2002 to July 2003,
their largest supercomputer Seaborg reached 98.74% sched-
uled availability, 14 days MTBI, and 3.3 hours MTTR. Stor-
age and file servers had similar availability. Two-thirds of
Seaborg’s outages and over 85% of storage system’s out-
ages are due to software.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we reported the failure data analysis of three
NCSA HPC systems, one of which is an array of distributed
shared memory mainframes and the rest are PC clusters.
The results show that the availability is 98.7-99.8%. Most
outages are due to software halts, but the downtime per out-
age is highest due to hardware halts or scheduled mainte-
nance. We also sought the distributions of time-between-
failures and time-to-repairs and found some of them exhibit
heavy-tail distributions instead of exponential. Finally, we
applied failure clustering analysis and identified several cor-
related failures. Because failure data analysis of HPC sys-
tem is scarce, we believe this paper provides very valuable
information for researchers and practioners working on re-
liability modeling and engineering.
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